A Drive to Survive: The Free Energy Principle and the Meaning of Life
暫譯: 生存的驅動力:自由能原則與生命的意義

Nave, Kathryn

  • 出版商: MIT
  • 出版日期: 2025-02-04
  • 售價: $2,310
  • 貴賓價: 9.5$2,195
  • 語言: 英文
  • 頁數: 318
  • 裝訂: Quality Paper - also called trade paper
  • ISBN: 0262551322
  • ISBN-13: 9780262551328
  • 海外代購書籍(需單獨結帳)

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商品描述

How the purposive behavior of living systems outstrips the constraints of the free energy principle.

Since 2005, Karl Friston's proposal that the principle of free energy minimization underpins the purposive behavior of living agents has evolved through thousands of publications. This principle's central move is to formalize the drive for self-preservation in terms of a single probabilistic imperative: to survive, a living system must consistently exhibit the same "most likely" pattern of activity over time. Despite the simplicity of this central claim, the free energy principle's complexity and rate of development have previously made it difficult to identify and evaluate. In A Drive to Survive, Kathryn Nave offers an extended critical analysis of the strengths and limitations of Friston's proposal.

Nave shows that the free energy principle's capacity to account for the biological origins of purposiveness is undermined by its applicability to any stable inanimate system. As this triviality has become apparent, so advocates have begun to reframe the free energy principle as a means to eliminate, rather than explain, the notion of distinctively biological purposiveness. This, Nave proposes, gets things the wrong way around. The triviality of free energy minimization does not prove that there is no difference in kind between living agents and ordinary machines, but rather it reflects that the framework cannot capture the intrinsic instability and unpredictability that distinguish the former.

商品描述(中文翻譯)

活系統的目的性行為如何超越自由能原則的限制。

自2005年以來,Karl Friston提出的自由能最小化原則支撐著活體代理的目的性行為,這一提議經過數千篇出版物的演變。這一原則的核心在於將自我保存的驅動力形式化為一個單一的概率命令:為了生存,活系統必須隨時間持續展現相同的「最可能」活動模式。儘管這一核心主張的簡單性,自由能原則的複雜性和發展速度使得之前難以識別和評估。在A Drive to Survive中,Kathryn Nave對Friston的提議的優勢和局限性進行了深入的批判性分析。

Nave指出,自由能原則解釋目的性的生物起源的能力受到其適用於任何穩定的無生命系統的影響。隨著這一平凡性變得明顯,倡導者開始重新框架自由能原則,將其視為消除而非解釋獨特生物目的性概念的手段。Nave提出,這樣的做法顛倒了事物的本質。自由能最小化的平凡性並不證明活體代理和普通機器之間沒有本質上的差異,而是反映出該框架無法捕捉到區分前者的內在不穩定性和不可預測性。

作者簡介

Kathryn Nave is a Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow at the University of Edinburgh, investigating the biological roots of agency, autonomy, and intelligence. Outside of academia, she has worked as a science and technology journalist for outlets including Wired, The Guardian, The Economist, and The New Statesman.

作者簡介(中文翻譯)

凱瑟琳·內夫(Kathryn Nave)是愛丁堡大學的Leverhulme早期職業研究員,研究代理性、自主性和智慧的生物學根源。在學術界之外,她曾擔任科學與技術記者,為《Wired》、《The Guardian》、《The Economist》和《The New Statesman》等媒體撰稿。