Cognitive Pluralism

Horst, Steven

  • 出版商: MIT
  • 出版日期: 2024-07-02
  • 售價: $2,450
  • 貴賓價: 9.5$2,328
  • 語言: 英文
  • 頁數: 376
  • 裝訂: Quality Paper - also called trade paper
  • ISBN: 0262552612
  • ISBN-13: 9780262552615
  • 海外代購書籍(需單獨結帳)

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商品描述

An argument that we understand the world through many special-purpose mental models of different content domains, and an exploration of the philosophical implications.

Philosophers have traditionally assumed that the basic units of knowledge and understanding are concepts, beliefs, and argumentative inferences. In Cognitive Pluralism, Steven Horst proposes that another sort of unit--a mental model of a content domain--is the fundamental unit of understanding. He argues that understanding comes not in word-sized concepts, sentence-sized beliefs, or argument-sized reasoning but in the form of idealized models and in domain-sized chunks. He argues further that this idea of "cognitive pluralism"--the claim that we understand the world through many such models of a variety of content domains--sheds light on a number of problems in philosophy.

Horst first presents the "standard view" of cognitive architecture assumed in mainstream epistemology, semantics, truth theory, and theory of reasoning. He then explains the notion of a mental model as an internal surrogate that mirrors features of its target domain, and puts it in the context of ideas in psychology, philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and theoretical cognitive science. Finally, he argues that the cognitive pluralist view not only helps to explain puzzling disunities of knowledge but also raises doubts about the feasibility of attempts to "unify" the sciences; presents a model-based account of intuitive judgments; and contends that cognitive pluralism favors a reliabilist epistemology and a "molecularist" semantics. Horst suggests that cognitive pluralism allows us to view rival epistemological and semantic theories not as direct competitors but as complementary accounts, each an idealized model of different dimensions of evaluation.

商品描述(中文翻譯)

一個論點是,我們透過許多針對不同內容領域的特殊目的心理模型來理解世界,並探討其哲學意涵。

哲學家們傳統上假設,知識和理解的基本單位是概念、信念和論證推理。在《Cognitive Pluralism》中,Steven Horst 提出另一種單位——內容領域的心理模型——是理解的基本單位。他主張,理解不是以字大小的概念、句子大小的信念或論證大小的推理形式出現,而是以理想化模型和領域大小的塊狀形式出現。他進一步主張,這種「認知多元主義」的觀念——即我們透過許多這樣的模型來理解世界,涵蓋各種內容領域——為哲學中的許多問題提供了啟示。

Horst 首先介紹了主流認識論、語義學、真理理論和推理理論中假設的「標準觀點」的認知架構。接著,他解釋了心理模型的概念,作為一種內部替代物,反映其目標領域的特徵,並將其置於心理學、科學哲學、人工智慧和理論認知科學的背景中。最後,他主張,認知多元主義的觀點不僅有助於解釋知識的困惑不一致性,還對「統一」科學的可行性提出質疑;提供了一種基於模型的直觀判斷解釋;並主張認知多元主義有利於可靠主義的認識論和「分子主義」的語義學。Horst 建議,認知多元主義使我們能夠將對立的認識論和語義理論視為互補的解釋,而不是直接競爭者,每一種都是不同評估維度的理想化模型。

作者簡介

Steven Horst is Professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan University. He is the author of Laws, Mind, and Free Will (MIT Press).

作者簡介(中文翻譯)

史蒂文·霍斯特是衛斯理大學的哲學教授。他是《法律、心智與自由意志》(麻省理工學院出版社)的作者。