The Huawei and Snowden Questions: Can Electronic Equipment from Untrusted Vendors be Verified? Can an Untrusted Vendor Build Trust into Electronic Equipment? (Simula SpringerBriefs on Computing)
暫譯: 華為與斯諾登問題：不受信任的供應商的電子設備能否被驗證？不受信任的供應商能否在電子設備中建立信任？ (Simula SpringerBriefs on Computing)

Preliminary

This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license.

This book answers two central questions: firstly, is it at all possible to verify electronic equipment procured from untrusted vendors? Secondly, can I build trust into my products in such a way that I support verification by untrusting customers?  In separate chapters the book takes readers through the state of the art in fields of computer science that can shed light on these questions. In a concluding chapter it discusses realistic ways forward.  

In discussions on cyber security, there is a tacit assumption that the manufacturer of equipment will collaborate with the user of the equipment to stop third-party wrongdoers. The Snowden files and recent deliberations on the use of Chinese equipment in the critical infrastructures of western countries have changed this. The discourse in both cases revolves around what malevolent manufacturers can do to harm their own customers, and the importance of the matter is on par with questions of national security.

This book is of great interest to ICT and security professionals who need a clear understanding of the two questions posed in the subtitle, and to decision-makers in industry, national bodies and nation states.