An Introduction to Game Theory (IE-Paperback)

Martin J. Osborne




An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences.

Each chapter ends with notes.
1. Introduction
1.1. What is Game Theory?
1.1.1. An Outline of the History of Game Theory
1.1.2. John von Neumann
1.2. The Theory of Rational Choice
1.3. Coming Attractions: Interacting Decision-Makers
2. Nash Equilibrium: Theory
2.1. Strategic Games
2.2. Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma
2.3. Example: Bach or Stravinsky?
2.4. Example: Matching Pennies
2.5. Example: The Stag Hunt
2.6. Nash Equilibrium
2.6.1. John F. Nash, Jr.
2.6.2. Studying Nash Equilibrium Experimentally
2.7. Examples of Nash Equilibrium
2.7.1. Experimental Evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma
2.7.2. Focal Points
2.8. Best Response Functions
2.9. Dominated Actions
2.10. Equilibrium in a Single Population: Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria
3. Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations
3.1. Cournot's Model of Oligopoly
3.2. Bertrand's Model of Oligopoly
3.2.1. Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: Some Historical Notes
3.3. Electoral Competition
3.4. The War of Attrition
3.5. Auctions
3.5.1. Auctions from Babylonia to eBay
3.6. Accident Law
4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Some Evidence on Expected Payoff Functions
4.2. Strategic Games in Which Players May Randomize
4.3. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
4.4. Dominated Actions
4.5. Pure Equilibria When Randomization is Allowed
4.6. Illustration: Expert Diagnosis
4.7. Equilibrium in a Single Population
4.8. Illustration: Reporting a Crime
4.8.1. Reporting a Crime: Social Psychology and Game Theory
4.9. The Formation of Players' Beliefs
4.10. Extension: Finding All Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria
4.11. Extension: Games in Which Each Player Has a Continuum of Actions
4.12. Appendix: Representing Preferences by Expected Payoffs
5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory
5.1. Extensive Games with Perfect Information
5.2. Strategies and Outcomes
5.3. Nash Equilibrium
5.4. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
5.5. Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite Horizon Games: Backward Induction
5.5.1. Ticktacktoe, Chess, and Related Games
6. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations
6.1. The Ultimatum Game, the Holdup Game, and Agenda Control
6.1.1. Experiments on the Ultimatum Game
6.2. Stackelberg's Model of Duopoly
6.3. Buying Votes
6.4. A Race
7. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion
7.1. Allowing for Simultaneous Moves
7.1.1. More Experimental Evidence on Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
7.2. Illustration: Entry into a Monopolized Industry
7.3. Illustration: Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters
7.4. Illustration: Committee Decision-Making
7.5. Illustration: Exit from a Declining Industry
7.6. Allowing for Exogenous Uncertainty
7.7. Discussion: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward Induction
7.7.1. Experimental Evidence on the Centipede Game
8. Coalitional Games and the Core
8.1. Coalitional Games
8.2. The Core
8.3. Illustration: Ownership and the Distribution of Wealth
8.4. Illustration: Exchanging Homogeneous Horses
8.5. Illustration: Exchanging Heterogeneous Houses
8.6. Illustration: Voting
8.7. Illustration: Matching
8.7.1. Matching Doctors with Hospitals
8.8. Discussion: Other Solution Concepts
9.1. Motivational Examples
9.2. General Definitions
9.3. Two Examples Concerning Information
9.4. Illustration: Cournot's Duopoly Game with Imperfect Information
9.5. Illustration: Providing a Public Good
9.6. Illustration: Auctions
9.6.1. Auctions of the Radio Spectrum
9.7. Illustration: Juries
9.8. Appendix: Auctions with an Arbitrary Distribution of Valuations
10. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
10.1. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
10.2. Strategies
10.3. Nash Equilibrium
10.4. Beliefs and Sequential Equilibrium
10.5. Signaling Games.
10.6. Illustration: Conspicuous Expenditure as a Signal of Quality
10.7. Illustration: Education as a Signal Of Ability
10.8. Illustration: Strategic Information Transmission
10.9. Illustration: Agenda Control with Imperfect Information
11. Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization
11.1. Maxminimization
11.2. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium
11.3. Strictly Competitive Games
11.4. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games
11.4.1. Maxminimization: Some History
11.4.2. Empirical Tests: Experiments, Tennis, and Soccer
12. Rationalizability
12.1. Rationalizability
12.2. Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions
12.3. Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions
12.4. Dominance Solvability
13. Evolutionary Equilibrium
13.1. Monomorphic Pure Strategy Equilibrium
13.1.1. Evolutionary Game Theory: Some History
13.2. Mixed Strategies and Polymorphic Equilibrium
13.3. Asymmetric Contests
13.3.1. Side-blotched lizards
13.3.2. Explaining the Outcomes of Contests in Nature
13.4. Variation on a Theme: Sibling Behavior
13.5. Variation on a Theme: The Nesting Behavior of Wasps
13.6. Variation on a Theme: The Evolution of the Sex Ratio
14. Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma
14.1. The Main Idea
14.2. Preferences
14.3. Repeated Games
14.4. Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.5. Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.6. Strategies in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.7. Some Nash Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.8. Nash Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.8.1. Experimental Evidence
14.9. Subgame Perfect Equilibria and the One-Deviation Property
14.9.1. Axelrod's Tournaments
14.10. Some Subgame Perfect Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.10.1. Reciprocal Altruism Among Sticklebacks
14.11. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.11.1. Medieval Trade Fairs
14.12. Concluding Remarks
15. Repeated Games: General Results
15.1. Nash Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated Games
15.2. Subgame Perfect Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated Games
15.3. Finitely Repeated Games
15.4. Variation on a Theme: Imperfect Observability
16. Bargaining
16.1. Bargaining as an Extensive Game
16.2. Illustration: Trade in a Market
16.3. Nash's Axiomatic Model
16.4. Relation Between Strategic and Axiomatic Models
17. Appendix: Mathematics
17.1. Numbers
17.2. Sets
17.3. Functions
17.4. Profiles
17.5. Sequences
17.6. Probability
17.7. Proofs


《博弈論入門》是Martin J. Osborne所著,介紹了博弈論的主要原則,並展示了如何應用這些原則來理解經濟、社會、政治和生物現象。本書以易於理解的方式介紹了理論背後的主要思想,而不是數學表達。所有概念都被精確地定義,並且在整本書中使用邏輯推理。本書需要對基本數學有一定的理解,但不需要具備特定的經濟學、政治學或其他社會或行為科學的知識。

1. 簡介
1.1. 什麼是博弈論?
1.1.1. 博弈論的歷史概述
1.1.2. 約翰·馮·諾依曼
1.2. 理性選擇理論
1.3. 即將到來的互動決策者
I. 完全信息的博弈
2. 納什均衡:理論
2.1. 策略博弈
2.2. 例子:囚徒困境
2.3. 例子:巴赫還是史特拉汶斯基?
2.4. 例子:硬幣對決
2.5. 例子:獵鹿
2.6. 納什均衡
2.6.1. 約翰·F·納什
2.6.2. 實驗研究納什均衡
2.7. 納什均衡的例子
2.7.1. 囚徒困境的實驗證據
2.7.2. 焦點點
2.8. 最佳反應函數
2.9. 被支配的行動
2.10. 單一人口的均衡:對稱博弈和對稱均衡
3. 納什均衡:實例
3.1. 奧利格opoly的Cournot模型
3.2. 奧利格opoly的Bertrand模型
3.2.1. Cournot、Bertrand和Nash:一些歷史注解
3.3. 選舉競爭
3.4. 消耗戰
3.5. 拍賣
3.5.1. 從巴比倫到eBay的拍賣
3.6. 事故法
4. 混合策略均衡
4.1. 簡介
4.1.1. 一些關於預期收益函數的證據
4.2. 策略博弈中的玩家可能隨機化
4.3. 混合策略納什均衡
4.4. 被支配的行動
4.5. 當允許隨機化時的純均衡
4.6. 實例:專家診斷
4.7. 單一人口的均衡
4.8. 實例:報告犯罪
4.8.1. 報告犯罪:社會心理學和博弈論
4.9. 玩家信念的形成
4.10. 擴展:找到所有混合策略納什均衡
4.11. 擴展:每個玩家都有連續行動的遊戲
4.12. 附錄:用預期收益來表示偏好
5. 完全信息的延伸博弈:理論
5.1. 完全信息的延伸博弈
5.2. 策略和結果
5.3. 納什均衡
5.4. 子博弈完美均衡
5.5. 找到有限時間範圍內的子博弈完美均衡:向後歸納