Algorithmic Game Theory

Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani

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Description

In the last few years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory develops the central ideas and results of this new and exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.

• First book to cover the whole spectrum of algorithmic game theory • Contributions by all the major researchers in the field • Applied chapters by researchers and consultants at major firms such as Yahoo, Lehman Brothers, IBM and Microsoft

 

Table of Contents

Introduction Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani; Part I. Computing in Games: 1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani; 2. Algorithms for equilibria Christos Papadimitriou; 3. Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form Bernhard von Stengel; 4. Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour; 5. Graphical games Michael J. Kearns; 6. Cryptography and game theory Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin; 7. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani; 8. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan; Part II. Algorithmic Mechanism Design: 9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Noam Nisan; 10. Mechanism design without money James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra; 11. Combinatorial auctions Noam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen; 12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms Ron Lavi; 13. Profit maximization in mechanism design Jason Hartline and Anna Karlin; 14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira and Scott Shenker; 15. Cost sharing Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian; 16. On-line mechanisms David C. Parkes; Part III. Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria: 17. Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos; 18. Routing games Tim Roughgarden; 19. Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games Éva Tardos and Tom Wexler; 20. Selfish load-balancing Berthold Vöcking; 21. Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms Ramesh Johari; Part IV. Additional Topics: 22. Incentives and pricing in communication networks Asuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant; 23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems John Chuang, Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff; 24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues Jon Kleinberg; 25. Incentives and information security Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja and Andy Ozment; 26. Computational aspects of information markets David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami; 27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick and Rahul Sami; 28. Sponsored search auctions Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi and Rakesh V. Vohra; 29. Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory Michael Kearns and Siddharth Suri.